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Countrywide roll-out of Xpert® MTB/RIF in Swaziland:  
the first three years of implementation
W. Sikhondze,1,2 T. Dlamini,1 D. Khumalo,1,3 G. Maphalala,4 S. Dlamini,4 T. Zikalala,3,5  
H. Albert,2 J. Wambugu,2 K. Tayler-Smith,6 E. Ali,6 S. Ade,7,8 A. D. Harries8,9
Sputum smear microscopy remains the most widely used technology for the diagnosis of pulmonary 
tuberculosis (TB) in low- and middle-income coun-
tries. Although inexpensive to perform, smear micros-
copy is cumbersome, costly for patients, diagnostically 
insensitive and does not detect drug-resistant TB. New 
diagnostic tools are therefore urgently needed in the 
fight against TB.1
The most important and revolutionary diagnostic 
development is a sensitive, specific, fully automated 
and commercially available nucleic acid amplification 
test, the Xpert® MTB/RIF assay (Cepheid Inc, Sunny-
vale, CA, USA), for use with sputum and other speci-
mens.1 Specimen processing prior to Xpert is greatly 
simplified compared with processing prior to culture, 
minimal laboratory expertise is required, results are 
provided in less than 2 h, and sensitivity and specific-
ity for the diagnosis of TB and susceptibility to rifam-
picin (RMP) are high.1 In 2010, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) strongly recommended the 
widespread use of Xpert, especially for individuals pre-
sumed to have multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB and hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV) associated TB.2,3
Work is ongoing to assess the feasibility, accuracy 
and effectiveness of Xpert at district and subdistrict 
health facilities.4,5 The instrument’s functionality in 
these settings depends on various operational factors, 
including cost, environmental temperatures, shelf-life 
of cartridges, electricity supplies, maintenance and the 
need for annual calibration of the machine.6
Swaziland is a lower middle-income country with a 
high burden of TB and HIV.7 In 2011, Xpert machines 
were introduced into the country with partner sup-
port, and although data on the tests performed and 
the number of patients diagnosed with TB and/or 
MDR-TB are available, there is little or no published 
information on the operational components of the 
technology, such as workload analysis, machine utili-
sation and operational challenges. Unpublished stud-
ies have been conducted in Lesotho and in Tanzania 
by the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics 
(FIND) to assess the implementation of Xpert, and a 
similar evaluation was performed by TB REACH in 
nine countries.5 This assessment, based on a conve-
nience sample of projects, identified that electrical 
power supply and inconsistent recording and report-
ing were the main operational challenges.
This first national study of the operational use of 
Xpert conducted in Swaziland used a standardised lab-
oratory monitoring and supervision checklist to assess 
operational and technical requirements of successful 
Xpert implementation. The country National TB Con-
trol Programme (NTCP) was also interested in finding 
out whether there were differences between govern-
ment- and partner-supported sites and between urban 
and rural areas. This is a priority area for operational 
research in global TB control.8
The aim of this study was to evaluate the current 
utilisation and functionality of Xpert in Swaziland 
from 2011 to mid-2014. Specific objectives were to de-
termine 1) the number of Xpert tests performed and 
the results, stratified by type of health facility labora-
tory; 2) site-specific monthly utilisation of Xpert per 
year in relation to the defined maximum monthly ca-
pacity for each machine; and 3) operational aspects 
and functionality of the Xpert machines, determined 
by the monitoring and supervision checklist scores.
METHODS
Study design
This was a descriptive study of Xpert implementation in 
Swaziland using routinely collected data and a stan-
dardised laboratory monitoring and supervision checklist.
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Setting: All 19 public health laboratories in Swaziland 
that had Xpert® MTB/RIF machines installed as part of a 
countrywide roll-out between June 2011 and June 2014.
Objective: To evaluate the utilisation and functionality of 
Xpert from 2011 to mid-2014.
Design: Descriptive study of Xpert implementation using 
routinely collected data.
Results: Of 48 829 Xpert tests conducted, 93% were 
successful: 14% detected Mycobacterium tuberculosis and 
12% showed rifampicin resistance. The most common 
cause of unsuccessful tests was an ‘Error’ result (62%). 
Similar findings were obtained in government-supported 
and partner-supported laboratories. Annual utilisation of 
Xpert improved from 51% of maximum capacity in 2011 
and 2012 to 74% in 2013 and 2014. A monitoring and 
supervision exercise of all Xpert testing sites in 2014 
showed a generally good performance, with over 50% of 
laboratories achieving a 80% score on most compo-
nents. However, poor scores were obtained with equip-
ment use and maintenance (6% achieving a score of 
80%), internal audit (19% achieving a score of 80%) 
and process control (25% achieving a score of 80%).
Conclusion: Countrywide roll-out of Xpert in Swaziland 
has been successful, although operational issues have 
been identified and need to be resolved.
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Setting
General setting and the National Tuberculosis 
Programme
Swaziland, a small mountainous kingdom in southern 
Africa with a total population of 1.2 million, is classi-
fied as a lower middle-income country.9,10 The country 
has the highest burden of TB per capita in the world, 
with estimates of 1380 per 100 000 population per an-
num.11 This is combined with high HIV prevalence 
rates in the adult population: 26% among those aged 
15–49 years, and over 40% in pregnant women.10 Na-
tional TB control efforts have been complicated by the 
associated HIV-TB epidemic, with co-infection rates es-
timated at 80% and increasing MDR-TB rates of 7.7% 
in new cases and 33.8% in retreatment cases.11,12 Swa-
ziland declared TB a national emergency on 24 March 
2011.11 The focus of the NTCP is on expanding access 
to directly observed treatment (DOT), diagnostic ser-
vices, treatment especially for drug-resistant TB and 
strengthening health systems. The National TB Refer-
ence Laboratory (NTRL), which has the overall respon-
sibility for the TB laboratory network, has overseen the 
rollout of GeneXpert® equipment for Xpert in all TB 
diagnostic laboratories and has adopted it as an initial 
diagnostic test for all presumptive TB cases in the 
country, regardless of HIV status or history of previous 
treatment.
Scale-up of Xpert machines in Swaziland
By June 2014, a total of 23 Xpert machines (22 4-mod-
ule machines and one 16-module machine) had been 
installed in 19 TB diagnostic laboratories, with future 
plans to install 13 more machines.13 To increase access 
to TB laboratory services, an effective sample transpor-
tation system, the National Sample Transportation Sys-
tem (NSTS), has been provided, covering 78% of the 
country (the Lubombo, Manzini and Hhohho regions), 
with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) covering the re-
maining Shiselweni region. Samples for culture and 
drug susceptibility testing (DST) are sent to the NTRL 
through the NSTS and via DHL couriers.
Monitoring of Xpert at each site
A standardised laboratory monitoring and supervision 
checklist developed by FIND was used to assess the op-
erational and functional aspects of Xpert in the TB di-
agnostic laboratories.* For each laboratory, the check-
list was completed with a numeric score assigned for 
each of the 12 quality system essentials. Each compo-
nent had a maximum score possible, and laboratories 
were assessed as to whether they achieved 80% of 
this score. If the score was 80% then the corrective 
action related to that component was carried out, in-
cluding intensified supportive supervision, with the 
aim of reassessing the laboratory at the next quarterly 
supervisory visit.
Study sites
The study sites included all public health laboratories 
in Swaziland that had one or more Xpert machines in-
stalled between June 2011 and June 2014.
* Checklist available from the corresponding author on request.
Data variables
Data variables were collected in relation to study ob-
jectives. For Objective 1, these included the number of 
machines and the number of Xpert tests conducted 
since installation, including successful tests with their 
results and unsuccessful tests with their reasons. For 
Objective 2, data variables included the number of 
tests performed for each Xpert machine. Given that a 
microscopist works 8 h per day, 20 days/month, the es-
timated maximum capacity for a 4-module machine is 
400 tests/month (for the 16-module machine it is 1600 
tests/month), excluding chances of error. The data 
sources for these two objectives were the archive files, 
retrieved and degenerated into raw data for analysis. 
For Objective 3, data variables included a score for 
each component on the standardised laboratory moni-
toring and supervision checklist. The data source was 
the standardised laboratory monitoring and supervi-
sion checklist used to assess laboratories during the 
course of the study. These laboratory assessments were 
conducted by WS and TZ.
Analysis and statistics
The data from the Excel files and the checklists were 
double-entered into an electronic EpiData file (version 
3.1, EpiData Association, Odense, Denmark). A de-
scriptive analysis was performed using frequencies and 
proportions. Comparisons were made between differ-
ent types of health facility laboratory using χ² tests, 
with levels of significance set at 5%.
Ethics approval
Permission for the study was obtained from the Swazi-
land NTCP, the NTRL and the local Swaziland Scien-
tific and Ethics Committee. The study met the MSF 
Ethics Review Board approved criteria for studies of 
routinely collected data, and was approved by the Eth-
ics Advisory Group of the International Union Against 
Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, Paris, France.
RESULTS
The number of Xpert tests performed and the test re-
sults for the period from June 2011 to June 2014 are 
shown in Table 1. Ninety-three per cent of the tests 
were successful, and of these, 14% detected Mycobacte-
rium tuberculosis. Most of these were drug-susceptible, 
with 12% showing resistance to RMP. The most com-
mon cause of an unsuccessful test was an ‘Error’ result 
(Table 2).
Government-supported health laboratories had 
more Xpert machines and performed more tests than 
partner-supported health laboratories, but the results 
were otherwise fairly similar between the two types of 
facility (Table 3). In government-supported health lab-
oratories, the number of tests was similar in urban and 
rural sites, although urban sites recorded a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of successful tests (P  0.001) 
(Table 4). ‘Error’ results were the most common cause 
of an unsuccessful test in all settings. However, an un-
successful test due to ‘No result’ was significantly more 
common in government-supported sites and in rural 
settings.
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TABLE 1 Number of Xpert® MTB/RIF machines, tests performed 
and results, Swaziland, June 2011–June 2014
Xpert machines, tests and test results n (%)
Xpert machines 25
 Tests performed 48 829
 Tests that were successful 45 326 (93)
 Tests detecting M. tuberculosis 6408 (14)*
Tests detecting M. tuberculosis that showed:
 RMP resistance not detected 5393 (84)†
 RMP resistance detected 789 (12)†
 RMP resistance indeterminate 226 (4)†
Tests that were unsuccessful 3503 (7)*
 Error results 2173 (62)‡
 No results 945 (27)‡
 Invalid results 385 (11)‡
* Tests that were successful.
† Tests that detected M. tuberculosis.
‡ Tests that were unsuccessful:
Error results: Probe Check Control failed and the assay was aborted due to the 
following:
• The reaction tube being filled improperly.
• A reagent probe integrity problem was detected.
• The maximum pressure limits were exceeded.
• A GeneXpert module failure.
No results: insufficient data were collected due to the following:
• Power failure as a result of interrupted electricity.
• Test stopped by the operator.
Invalid results: presence or absence of M. tuberculosis could not be determined due 
to the following:
• Sample Processing Control did not meet acceptance criteria.
• Sample was not properly processed.
• PCR was inhibited.
RMP = rifampicin; PCR = polymerase chain reaction.
TABLE 2 Main causes of ‘Error’ results in the tests performed with 
Xpert® MTB/RIF machines, Swaziland, June 2011–June 2014
Error code n (%) Cause Origin
Code 2127 1150 (53) Module communication 
loss was detected
Power supply issue 
(main power or UPS 
fluctuations/failure)
Code 2008 122 (6) Tube pressure exceeds 
the maximum 
pressure allowed
Sample too viscous, 
indicating poor 
sample preparation
Code 2037 121 (6) Cartridge integrity 
testing
If tube pressure is not 
correct, the software 
stops the test as the 
cartridge is not 
airtight (quality issue). 
May indicate poor 
cartridge manufacture 
or poor storage 
conditions
Code 1001 112 (5) Temperature/heater 
failure
High temperature in 
module; heater 
component failure; 
broken fan; dust on 
filter near fan. 
Indicates poor 
machine maintenance
All 15 other 
codes
590 (27) Multiple causes Multiple reasons
UPS = uninterruptible power supply.
TABLE 3 Number of Xpert® MTB/RIF machines, tests performed 
and results in government- and partner-supported health 
laboratories, Swaziland, June 2011–June 2014
Xpert machines, tests and test 
results
All government-
supported health 
laboratories
n (%)
Partner-supported 
health laboratories
n (%)
Xpert machines 15 10
Tests performed 28 188 20 641
Tests that were successful 26 104 (93) 19 222 (93)
Tests detecting M. tuberculosis 3608 (14)* 2800 (15)*
Tests detecting M. tuberculosis 
that showed:
 RMP resistance not detected 3046 (84)† 2347 (84)†
 RMP resistance detected 408 (11)† 381 (14)†
 RMP resistance indeterminate 154 (4)† 72 (2)†
Tests that were unsuccessful 2084 (7)* 1419 (7)*
 Error results‡ 1233 (59)§ 940 (66)§
 No results‡ 687 (33)§ 258 (18)§
 Invalid results‡ 164 (8)§ 221 (16)§
* Tests that were successful.
† Tests that detected M. tuberculosis.
‡ See Table 1 for definitions.
§ Tests that were unsuccessful.
RMP = rifampicin; PCR = polymerase chain reaction.
TABLE 4 Number of Xpert® MTB/RIF machines, tests performed 
and results in urban and rural government-supported health 
laboratories, Swaziland, June 2011–June 2014
Xpert machines, tests and test 
results
Urban government-
supported health 
laboratories
n (%)
Rural government-
supported health 
laboratories
n (%)
Xpert machines 7 8
Tests performed 14 194 13 994
Tests that were successful 13 280 (94) 12 824 (92)
Tests detecting M. tuberculosis 1820 (13)* 1788 (14)*
Tests detecting M. tuberculosis 
that showed:
 RMP resistance not detected 1537 (84)† 1509 (84)†
 RMP resistance detected 203 (14)† 205 (12)†
 RMP resistance indeterminate 80 (4)† 74 (4)†
Tests that were unsuccessful 914 (6)* 1170 (8)*
 Error results‡ 608 (67)§ 625 (53)§
 No results‡ 219 (24)§ 468 (40)§
 Invalid results‡ 87 (9)§ 77 (7)§
* Tests that were successful.
† Tests that detected M. tuberculosis.
‡ See Table 1 for definitions.
§ Tests that were unsuccessful.
RMP = rifampicin; PCR = polymerase chain reaction.
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The monthly utilisation of Xpert machines in relation to max-
imum monthly capacity for each of the 4 years is shown in the 
Figure (A–D). In 2011 and 2012, annual utilisation was approxi-
mately 50% of maximum capacity, and in 2013 and 2014 this in-
creased to 74% for both years.
The number and proportion of laboratory sites achieving a 
score of 80% for each component of the Xpert site monitoring 
and supervision checklist is shown in Table 5. More than half of 
the laboratories performed well on most components. The three 
components for which laboratories performed badly were equip-
ment use and maintenance (6% achieved a score of 80%), inter-
nal audit (19% achieved a score of 80%) and process control 
(25% achieved a score of 80%). For equipment use, the main 
cause of low scores was a lack of recording of maintenance and 
repairs to the machine by the operator. For internal audit, there 
was no established external quality assurance (EQA) scheme to 
validate sputum results from the Xpert tests in Swaziland. For 
process control, there was poor documentation of samples re-
ceived and results obtained in the laboratory registers.
The results of the monitoring and supervision exercise were 
similar when partner-supported laboratories were compared with 
government-supported laboratories (Table 5). Within govern-
ment-supported laboratories, almost identical results were found 
between urban and rural sites (Table 6).
DISCUSSION
This study of the national roll-out of Xpert in Swaziland in the 
last 3 years shows successful early implementation of the new 
technology. In terms of utilisation, nearly 50 000 tests were con-
ducted. The large majority of tests were successful, and detected 
TB in one in seven patients. Of these, RMP resistance was identi-
fied in just over 10%. The main cause of an unsuccessful test was 
an ‘Error’ result, with power supply issues being the main reason, 
despite having an uninterrupted power supply for each Xpert ma-
chine. Fairly similar results of implementation were found be-
tween partner-supported and government-supported sites and be-
tween urban and rural government facilities. In the first 18-month 
period, utilisation of the Xpert machines was at 50% of maximum 
capacity, but this increased to about 75% in the second 18-month 
period, indicating better use of the resource as experience was 
gained.
The June 2014 monitoring and supervision exercise showed 
that laboratories generally performed well against a standardised 
checklist. The cut-off of 80% for each component was arbitrary, 
and related to what was thought to be a realistic standard in the 
routine setting for determining that corrective action was needed. 
With time and experience this cut-off will be set at a higher level. 
The main problems identified during supervision were related to 
health care worker performance, either with the maintenance of 
the machine or with the recording and reporting of sputum speci-
mens and results. These could be corrected with refresher train-
ing, mentorship and onsite supportive supervision. With regard 
to the internal audit, in 2013 Swaziland enrolled all sites perform-
ing Xpert in an EQA proficiency testing scheme run by the US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, GA, USA) 
International Laboratory Branch. However, during the course of 
the study, some reports were not available on site as evidence of 
participation, and suggested lack of feedback of proficiency test-
ing results to sites.
The strengths of this study are that it was conducted nationwide 
and included government- and partner-supported health facilities. 
The study was a joint collaboration between the NTCP and the 
NTRL, and as similar methods were used to assess laboratories, ex-
FIGURE A–D Average monthly utilisation of Xpert® MTB/RIF instruments in relation to the defined maximum monthly capacity for each of the 
4 years, Swaziland, 2011–2014. A) 2011; B) 2012; C) 2013 and D) 2014.
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tract and analyse data, there was no methodological bias. Finally, 
the study adhered to the Strengthening the Reporting of Observa-
tional studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) guidelines and sound eth-
ical principles.14,15 The operational challenges encountered may be 
context-specific, however, and not applicable to other countries.
There are some important lessons to be learnt from this roll-
out of Xpert. The WHO Case Definition Framework, which in-
cludes Xpert results, was only updated in 2013,16 and lack of in-
ternational guidance before this date has hampered the 
enumeration and proper documentation of results. As new tech-
nology is introduced, it is important to ensure that standardised 
methods of incorporating results into records and reports are up-
dated as early as possible. At the time of roll-out of the Xpert ma-
chines, there was no dedicated government budget to support 
maintenance, annual calibration, modular replacements and pur-
chasing of warranty packages, and we believe that this has con-
tributed to the number of unsuccessful tests.
What are the implications of this study? First, there has been a 
considerable increase in the scale-up of Xpert. By September 
2014, 3553 Xpert machines and over 8.8 million cartridges had 
been procured in the public sector in 110 of the 145 countries eli-
gible for concessional pricing.17 The global evidence base needs 
more national studies, similar to this report from Swaziland, de-
scribing the implementation, utilisation and functionality of this 
new technology. Second, as the machines need to be functional 
all the time, the costs of maintenance, calibration and uninter-
rupted power supplies need to be incorporated into country bud-
gets for machine function, maintenance and cartridge procure-
TABLE 5 Number and proportion of laboratory sites achieving an 80% score for each component of the 
Xpert® MTB/RIF site monitoring and supervision checklist as assessed in June 2014, Swaziland, stratified by 
government- and partner-supported sites
Components of site supervision and 
monitoring checklist*
Total score 
possible for each 
component
Sites achieving 80% for each component score
All sites
(n = 16)
n (%)
Government-supported 
health laboratories
(n = 10)
n (%)
Partner-supported 
health laboratories
(n = 6)
n (%)
Documents and records 12 13 (81) 8 (80) 5 (83)
Management review 4 14 (88) 9 (90) 5 (83)
Organisation and personnel 8 9 (56) 6 (60) 3 (50)
Operational 12 16 (100) 10 (100) 6 (100)
Equipment use and maintenance 18 1 (6) 0 (0) 1 (17)
Internal audit 4 3 (19) 1 (10) 2 (33)
Purchasing and inventory 18 14 (88) 9 (90) 5 (83)
Process control 24 4 (25) 3 (30) 1 (17)
Information management 22 10 (63) 6 (60) 4 (67)
Corrective action 6 9 (56) 8 (80) 1 (17)
Occurrence management 6 13 (81) 8 (80) 5 (83)
Facility and safety 26 11 (69) 6 (60) 5 (83)
* The details of each component of the supervision and monitoring checklist are available from the corresponding author on request.
TABLE 6 Number and proportion of laboratory sites achieving an 80% score for each component of the 
Xpert® MTB/RIF site monitoring and supervision checklist as assessed in June 2014, Swaziland, stratified by 
urban and rural government supported laboratories
Components of site supervision and 
monitoring checklist*
Total score 
possible for each 
component
Sites achieving 80% for each component score
Urban government-supported 
health laboratories
(n = 4)
n (%)
Rural government-supported 
health laboratories
(n = 6)
n (%)
Documents and records 12 3 (75) 5 (83)
Management review 4 4 (100) 5 (83)
Organisation and personnel 8 3 (75) 3 (50)
Operational 12 4 (100) 6 (100)
Equipment use and maintenance 18 0 (0) 0 (0)
Internal audit 4 0 (0) 1 (17)
Purchasing and inventory 18 4 (100) 5 (83)
Process control 24 2 (50) 1 (17)
Information management 22 2 (50) 4 (67)
Corrective action 6 3 (75) 4 (67)
Occurrence management 6 3 (75) 5 (83)
Facility and safety 26 3 (75) 3 (50)
* The details of each component of the supervision and monitoring checklist are available from the corresponding author on request.
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ment. Cepheid has developed an extended warranty package 
(from 1 to 5 years) to accommodate some of the challenges for 
low- and middle-income countries. Third, the data need to be 
backed up centrally to ensure timely retrieval in case of system 
(computer) failure. Remote monitoring systems need to be inte-
grated into the routine implementation of Xpert. Fourth, the one-
off monitoring and supervision exercise that was carried out in 
June 2014 needs to be assessed to determine its value in identify-
ing and rectifying problems and improving the output of success-
ful tests. Finally, national monitoring should be combined with 
national programme supervision to record and report the treat-
ment outcomes of TB patients as Xpert is further rolled out. Re-
cent studies from Africa have shown that Xpert increases the 
number of confirmed TB cases and reduces the time between di-
agnosis and the start of treatment, but as yet there seems to be 
little impact on reducing morbidity and mortality.18,19
In conclusion, the national roll-out of Xpert in Swaziland has 
gone well. The majority of the tests have been successful, with 
one in seven patients detected with TB, increasing utilisation of 
the machines as experience of their use is gained, along with 
fewer stock-outs of Xpert cartridges, more partner support for lab-
oratory staff, more site supervision and increased confidence in 
using the technology. Monitoring and supervision have identified 
some operational issues that need to be resolved.
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Contexte  :  Tous les 19 laboratoires de santé publique du Swaziland 
qui ont bénéficié de l’installation de machines Xpert® MTB/RIF dans 
le cadre d’un déploiement dans l’ensemble du pays entre juin 2011 
et juin 2014.
Objectif  :  Evaluer l’utilisation et la fonctionnalité du text Xpert de 
2011 à juin 2014.
Schéma  :  Etude descriptive de la mise en œuvre du test Xpert grâce à 
des données recueillies en routine.
Resultats  :  Au total, 48 829 tests Xpert ont été réalisés. Parmi eux, 
93% l’ont été avec succès dont 14% qui ont détecté Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis ; parmi ces derniers, 12% étaient résistants à la 
rifampicine. La cause la plus fréquente de tests non aboutis a été un 
résultat qualifié d’ « Erreur » (62%). Des laboratoires soutenus par le 
gouvernement et par des partenaires ont obtenu des résultats 
similaires. L’utilisation annuelle du test Xpert s’est améliorée, passant 
de 51% de la capacité maximale en 2011 et 2012 à 74% en 2013 et 
2014. Un exercice de suivi et évaluation de tous les sites de tests 
Xpert en 2014 a mis en évidence une performance généralement 
bonne, puisque plus de 50% des laboratoires atteignaient un score 
80% sur la majorité des éléments. Cependant, des scores médiocres 
ont été obtenus en ce qui concerne l’utilisation des équipements et 
leur maintenance (6% des sites atteignant un score 80%), l’audit 
interne (19% atteignant un score 80%) et le contrôle des 
procédures (25% atteignant un score 80%).
Conclusion  :  Le déploiement national du test Xpert au Swaziland a 
été un succès, même si certains problèmes opérationnels ont été 
identifiés et nécessitent d’être résolus.  
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Marco de referencia: Los 19 laboratorios de salud pública de 
Swazilandia que cuentan con el sistema diagnóstico Xpert® MTB/RIF, 
que se instauró como parte del despliegue a escala nacional realizado 
de junio del 2011 a junio del 2014.
Objetivo: Evaluar la utilización del sistema Xpert y su funcionalidad 
del 2011 hasta mediados del 2014.
Método: Se llevó a cabo un estudio descriptivo de la ejecución del 
sistema Xpert a partir de los datos recogidos de manera sistemática.
Resultados: En el período de estudio se practicaron 48 829 
pruebas Xpert. En el 93% de las pruebas se obtuvo un resultado 
adecuado, de las cuales el 14% detectó cepas de Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis; el 12% de estas cepas exhibió resistencia a rifampicina. 
La causa más frecuente de fallo de la prueba fue un resultado de 
‘error’ (62%). Estos datos concuerdan con los registrados en los 
laboratorios financiados por el gobierno o por otros asociados. La 
utilización anual de las pruebas Xpert aumentó, de un 51% de la 
capacidad máxima en el 2011 y el 2012 hasta un 74% en el 2013 y 
el 2014. Un ejercicio de seguimiento y supervisión de todos los 
centros que practican las pruebas Xpert realizado en el 2014 puso 
en evidencia un rendimiento adecuado global y más del 50% de 
los laboratorios alcanzó una puntuación  80% en la mayoría de 
los componentes. Sin embargo, las puntuaciones fueron bajas en 
materia de utilización y mantenimiento de los equipos (un 6% de 
laboratorios obtuvo una puntuación 80%), supervisión interna 
(un 19% obtuvo una puntuación 80%) y de control de los 
procedimientos (un 25% de laboratorios logró una puntuación 
80%).
Conclusión: El despliegue del sistema Xpert a escala nacional en 
Swazilandia ha sido eficaz, pese a que se detectaron algunos aspectos 
operativos que precisan rectificación.
